This is not the time or the place to thoroughly examine in
what manner the Vatican manifested sympathy for the idea of the Ukrainian state,
and what was the motive behind this sympathy. This shall be done by the
historian who, at the proper time, gains access to the sources which are
certainly to be found in the Vatican and other places.
— Petro Karmansky, “Cardinal Gasparri and Ukraine,” (1934)
Born during
Benedict XV’s Reign
There
is no peace for Ukraine, not a hundred years after it fleetingly appeared on
the world stage, nor twenty-five years after having finally achieved
independence, following centuries of the oblivion of imperial subjugation. One
hundred years ago, Benedict XV addressed to the world the words “nations do not
die.” Sometimes, however, nations are born only with great difficulty, as in Ukraine,
whose cause did not provoke any moralizing campaign of sympathy from the
Western powers. During the pontificate of Benedict XV, Ukraine was born as a
state but died as a nation that never enjoyed a day of peace. Nonetheless, Pope
Della Chiesa took up the cause of Ukraine and strove, with significant
gestures, to bring peace to “his dear Ukrainians.”
Rus – Ruthenia –
Ukraine
“Nation” is a modern concept. There is no
strict necessity for any given nation to come into being. But the process of
national awakening among certain ethnic groups is an historical fact.
Ukrainian national consciousness emerged in the nineteenth century, based on
various precedents. In the ninth century, The Norse Ruriks, who ruled over Slavic
tribes surrounding the Dnipro river, formed a state called Rus’ with it capital
in Kyiv. The people of Kyivan-Rus eventually constituted themselves into three
nations: Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. After the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth
century, the political and cultural inheritance of Kyivan-Rus passed to Lithuania,
Poland, and Muscovy. The people called themselves Rusyn or Ruski in the plural.
Westerners began to refer to those in Poland-Lithuania as Rutheni.
Prince
Volodymyr (or Vladimir) had accepted Byzantine Christianity in 988. After the
Great Schism, the Orthodox Church of Rus continued to maintain some contact with
the Roman Apostolic See. In 1253 Pope Innocent IV sent his legate with a kingly
crown to Danylo prince of Halych, the last independent Rus principality. Most
of south-western Rus passed to Lithuania but Halych was conquered in 1367 by
the Polish King. North-Eastern Rus became Muscovy.
In
1439, Isidore, Metropolitan of Kyiv, signed the act of union of the Roman and
Byzantine Churches at the Council of Florence, and was made a cardinal. But his
efforts to make the union a reality were met with opposition at home. In 1595,
the bishops of the Kyivan Metropolia signed another act of union with the Roman
See. This “Union of Brest” only united portion of the Kyivan Church, while
another portion remained in communion with the Orthodox world. The Kyivan
Metropolitans received patriarchal-like powers from the Roman Pontiff. Yet, despite
opposition from Roman Catholics and Orthodox, the Uniate Church flourished in
Poland-Lithuania, and Pope Urban VIII told the Ruthenians that he hoped to
convert the entire East through them.
As Muscovy, renamed Russia, encroached
upon Poland-Lithuania, the Uniates were forcibly amalgamated to the Russian Orthodox
Church. After the final partition in 1795, the Uniate Church was destined to
survive only Austrian Galicia (named for the old Halych principality). Empress
Maria Theresa abolished the term “Uniate” as pejorative, and replaced it with
“Greek Catholic,” on par with her Roman Catholic subjects.
With
the awakening of the nations after the French Revolution, the Ruthenians also
began to assert national-ethnic consciousness. The Ukrainian risorgimento began in Austrian Galicia
and was led by the Greek-Catholic clergy, in the absence of their secular
nobility, which had adopted a Polish consciousness. As the popoli italici of various dialects and principalities, became the nazione italiana, so the Ruthenians of
the Austrian and Russian Empires came to see themselves as a single nation. And
as Italia was once only a
geographical term, so the geographical designation Ukraïna was adopted as a national descriptive, to distinguish the
nation from Russia.
Pro and
Contra Relations with Ukraine
Until the First World War, the
Russian Empire was the most powerful state in central-eastern Europe and
represented the determining factor papal policy. Viewing the region’s political
and religious futures in the Russian context, Leo XIII had inaugurated a
diplomatic outreach to the Russia and, at the same time, supported religious “unionism,”
as opposed to Latin missionary proselytism, as a means for eventual ecclesial reunion.
The policy aimed to strengthen and support Eastern Catholicism, especially
among the Ruthenians, so that they would become missionaries to nearby Orthodox
countries.
The
papacy’s relations with the stateless Ruthenian-Ukrainian people were mainly
ecclesiastical and determined by a religious-political policy geared to each
empire to which Ukrainians were subject. From the second half of the 19th
century, as a distinct nation began to manifest itself, the Holy See had to
factor Ukraine into its outlook. Religiously, Ukrainians were viewed within a
unionistic framework: Greek-Catholics in Austria were looked upon as the protagonists
of unionism, and Orthodox Christians in Russian Ukraine were viewed as the
object of unionistic hopes. The Holy See had no political hopes for Ukrainians,
either in Austria or in Russia. Better
relations with Russia aimed to secure increased freedom for Catholics in the
Tsarist Empire. Since Austria-Hungary took Poland’s place as the Catholic state
in central-Eastern Europe, the Holy See saw it as an antidote against the
encroaching influence of Orthodox Russia. Consequently, Rome did not favor
independence for any of Austria’s constituent nationalities. The First World
War threw the status quo into chaos
and necessitated a reconfiguration of the papal outlook for central-eastern
Europe.
Open Diplomacy “Above
the parties”
Benedict
XV’s pontificate saw a return the grande politique of Leo XIII which he
himself had helped Cardinal Rampolla implement, while serving in the
Secretariat of State. The policy of patient, free-maneuver diplomacy, independent
of political alliances and with diplomatic outreach to all states, was perfectly
suited to new states like Ukraine. In his first encyclical letter, the Pope
identified nationalistic hatred as one if he principal causes of the war. Nevertheless,
as the conflict developed, so Vatican policy
evolved from favoring a political
status quo to one of reserved
acceptance of national movements. With Catholics on all sides of conflict
demanding papal support, Benedict XV moved from favoring a policy of disinterested
neutrality to that of a peacemaker and mediator “above the parties.” His two
main diplomatic objectives, general pacification and drawing separated Christians closer
to Rome, spoke directly to the Ukrainian situation.
Ukraine between
Russian and Austrian/Polish policies
At first, Benedict XV
did not have a specific Ukrainian policy. The future of “Ruthenians,” was seen the
contexts of the two empires to which they were subject. The Holy See supported
the integrity of Austria-Hungary as the strongest Catholic state in central Europe.
As to Russia, the Vatican was favorable to autonomy or independence of as many
as possible of the nations, due to the Tsarist Empire’s consistent oppression
of Catholicism. This was especially true for Poland, the largest portion of
which had been partitioned to Russia. During the war, the Holy See took up
Polish cause and the pope included it his 1917 Peace Note. When it became clear
that the Austrian Empire could not be salvaged, the Vatican turned to Poland as
a substitute Catholic power. Following Polish independence, Rome situated
Ukrainians between its Polish and Russian policies.
The Turning
Point of Revolution
The
1917 Revolutions in Russia marked a turned-point for Vatican policy. Since the
Provisional Government granted religious freedom, the Roman Curia had to consider
the best way of re-introducing, in those vast regions, the Catholic presence which
had been suffocated under Tsarist rule. The revolutions strengthened the
national movements of Russia’s subject peoples and facilitated their
independence. A the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, of February 1918, the Central
Powers recognized the newly-proclaimed Ukrainian National Republic and immediately
transformed it into a client state.
The
euphoria that followed religious freedom in Russia gave rise to “mirages” of union
between a number of national Orthodox Churches and Rome. In response to such
hopes, Benedict XV established an autonomous department, the Sacred
Congregation for the Eastern Church, to coordinate Eastern Catholic life and
promote unionistic missions. The new office was given significant authority promote
and defend the Eastern Catholic Churches. The Oriental Congregation, as it was
often referred to, paid careful attention to religious and political affairs of
the Ukrainian National Republic as well as those of the Ukrainian
Greek-Catholics in Austria.
Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky
Perhaps
the most important Eastern-Catholic leader of the period was Metropolitan
Andrey Sheptytsky, Archbishop of Lviv-Halych and primate of the Ukrainian
Greek-Catholic Church. Of Ruthenian-Polish aristocratic lineage, Sheptytsky
chose to return to his eastern roots by enlisting in Basilian Order, one of Leo
XIII’s unionist experiments. In the eyes of the Poles who governed Austrian
Galicia, his duel pedigree made Sheptytsky ideal for leading the Greek-Catholic
Church along a subservient path, at the time when Ukrainian national
consciousness was taking hold.
Sheptytsky’s
ideals sprang from the Leo XIII’s unionism but matured due to his personal
contacts among the Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian elites. In 1907, he obtained
unprecedented powers from Pius X, kept secret even from the Secretary of State
Cardinal Merry del Val, to begin rebuilding the foundations for Eastern
Catholic Churches where they had been suppressed by Russia. Sheptytsky
cautiously but also critically supported the Ukrainian national movement in
Austrian Galicia.
Only
days before the election of Benedict XV, Sheptytsky was arrested by Russian
invaders, as a dangerous opponent to Tsarist assimilation plans. Cardinal
Gasparri launched an energetic yet fruitless diplomatic campaign for his
release. From Siberian captivity, Sheptytsky sent six letters to the new
pontiff, outlining his unionist vision for Russia and Ukraine. As soon as he
was freed, the metropolitan established a Russian Catholic Exarchate, using the
secret faculties granted him by Pius X. Benedict XV tended to favor
Sheptytsky’s proposal for a predominantly Byzantine-Rite as opposed to a Latin
mission, in post-revolutionary Russia. This view was fiercely opposed by the
Poles, who had long held the monopoly over Catholic activities in Russia.
As
long as Italy and Austria were at war, Sheptytsky was barred from visiting Rome,
to explain his plans to the Pope and prove the authenticity of his special
faculties. His first meeting with Benedict XV occurred in February 1921, and it
provoked a turning point in Vatican policy. Pope Benedict confirmed the
faculties, recognized the bishop that Sheptytsky had consecrated using them,
and confirmed the Russian exarch that he had nominated.
The Holy See’s
Relations with Ukraine
Until
the First World War, Ukrainian representation at the Papal Court was
exclusively religious in character. Since the Union of Brest, the Metropolitans
of Kyiv maintained a procurator to the Holy See. At the outbreak of the War,
Ukrainians began a campaign to bring their still-stateless nation to the
attention of the international community. They also entered into direct contact
with the Roman Curia and papal diplomatic representatives abroad. Catholic aristocrats
from Russian Ukraine, who were friends of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, were among Ukraine’s
most ardent promoters.
The
most important of these amateur diplomats was Count Michael Tyshkevych. With his
vast financial resources and social connections, Tyshkevych moved to
Switzerland to promote the Ukrainian cause and was largely responsible for
brining it to the attention of the western press. Several qualities also made
him an ideal representative to the Vatican: he had a western European education,
he was a papal knight, and founder of Catholic associations in Russia. As both
the Holy See and Ukraine were seeking international recognition, Tyshkevych
sought to promote Ukraine by collaborating with Benedict XV’s ideals: peace and
humanitarian diplomacy.
Tyshkevych
had already obtained Pius X’s encouragement in founding the Kyiv Peace
Association. On 27 December 1914, he approached the papal Secretariat of State
for a blessing from the new pontiff, not omitting to ask for support for the
suffering Ukrainian nation. On 9 January 1915, Monsignor Pacelli communicated
the apostolic blessing with the qualification “(for you and your work),” likely
in order to avoid any inference of support for any Ukrainian political cause. On
1 June 1916, Tyshkevych approached Pacelli again, touching on another of Pope
Benedict’s key policies: church unity. He told Pacelli that both Catholic and
Orthodox Ukrainians of Austria and Russia had asked him to approach him to the
their “protector and intermediary” by delivering a confidential memorandum on Ukraine to
His Holiness. On 9 June, Pacelli wrote to assure him that he had delivered the
document personally.
In 1917, Count Tyshkevych began to write
directly to Cardinal Gasparri. Pope Benedict had launched a collection for the
Poles and Lithuanians devastated by the war. On 17 February, Tyshkevych sent a petition
asking for a such collection to be initiated for the Ukrainians. In March 1918,
he brought greetings to the pontiff from the Association of Romans Catholics in
Ukraine, as newly-elected head of their association. He also presented a
memorandum in support of the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk’s controversial award of
the disputed Kholm region to the nascent Ukrainian Republic.
The
Ukrainian State was slow to make use of the Catholic notables that had promoted
its cause abroad. Only on 1 September
1918 did Tyshkevych ask the Holy See to accept an official Ukrainian
representative. However, after the signing of the Brest Treaty, the Germans
occupied Ukraine and turned it into a satellite state, recognized only by the
Central Powers. Given the uncertainly of the war’s outcome, Cardinal Gasparri preferred
to “defer this project, for a time.”
Michael
Tyshkevych having failed, another Catholic aristocrat took up the cause. In October
1918, Jan Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz, who was serving as attaché to the Ukrainian
consulate in Vienna, approached the Apostolic Visitor to Poland, Achille Ratti,
on the matter of Vatican-Ukrainian relations. With the fall of Austria-Hungary,
8 November 1918 Benedict XV gave orders for his representatives to establish
relations with the nationalities. In March 1919 Tokarzewski went to see the
Nuncio in Vienna and informed him that his government had decided to send a
three-man diplomatic mission to the Holy See, headed by Count Tyshkevych.
Tokarzewski suggested that diplomatic relations were necessary due to the
possibilities for Catholicism in predominantly Orthodox Ukraine. On 12 March
1919, the Ukrainian consul in Berne asked Monsignor Maglione to transmit an
official request for a diplomatic mission to be accredited to the Holy See.
Cardinal
Gasparri responded to Maglione on 26 March 1919, that the Holy See would be
particularly happy to enter into diplomatic relations with Ukraine, especially
in view of its promised freedom for Catholicism. However, it did not accord
full relations to new countries that had not been recognized by the Great Powers
(meaning the Entente). In the meantime, only Tyshkevych, deemed “acceptable,
being already in relations with the Papal Court,” was to be received in the role
of semi-official envoy. The UNR regarded the
acceptance of Tyshkevych’s mission as recognition by the Holy See of the
Ukrainian State. In reality, it merely represented a de facto recognition of the UNR Government and a gesture of good
will, in the hope that, if the state would survive, the Church would be
accorded the promised religious freedom.
Michael
Tyshkevych spent virtually two years educating the Holy See about the Ukrainian
national cause, promising a bright future for Catholicism in Ukraine, and reporting
on the political and humanitarian challenges faced by the nascent republic. He
was received several times by curial officials and, on 26 May 1919, by Benedict
XV himself. The pontiff assured him that he supported “the autonomy of Ukraine”
and had asked his representative at the Peace Conference to defend the
Ukrainian cause. From
August 1919, Tyshkevych took charge of the UNR delegation at the Paris Peace
Conference, during which time he did not neglecting his Vatican contacts. He
pursued a fruitless quest for full diplomatic recognition through 1920. The
Pope’s promise to support Ukraine at the Paris Conference was confirmed by
Cardinal Gasparri on 20 July 1920.
Achille Ratti
and the Polish-Ukrainian War
Six
month before the First World War’s end, Benedict XV sent Vatican Librarian Achille
Ratti to Warsaw as Apostolic Visitor, to resuscitate the Polish Church,
devastated from over a century of Russian rule. Ratti’s mission was soon extended
to include Russia and formerly Austrian Galicia. By November 1918, his
visitation technically included all the lands which the Ukrainians declared to
be part of their national state.
In
the conflict between Poles and Ukrainians, Benedict XV’s predictions about
nationalistic hatred came true, and his stance as mediator “above the parties”
was put to the test. Following the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy, the two
nations fought over the sovereignty of Eastern Galicia. A national conflict became
a religious feud between Roman-Catholic Poles and the Greek-Catholic
Ukrainians. Each side was supported in their political aspirations by their
respective hierarchies and clergies, and each called the Holy See to support the
rightness of their cause. Ratti declared that the Pope supported both peoples but
left political judgments to the politicians. He intervened with authorities from
both sides on behalf of those who had been harshly treated. Although publically
combatting ingrained prejudice against the Eastern Churches, privately and to
his superiors he expressed relief at the Polish victory in Galicia.
In
the end, the Polish-Ukrainian War had affected Achille Ratti’s idealistic
perceptions. By the time of his appointment as Apostolic Nuncio to Poland, in
July 1919, his attitude toward Polish Catholicism had become more critical,
especially regarding its attitude toward national minorities and strong aversion
to the Eastern Rites. Any correctives that Ratti offered the Poles went largely
unnoticed to the vanquished Ukrainians, who were forced to endure harsh repression.
Complaints about the persecution of Greek-Catholics prompted the Roman Curia to
rethink its position regarding an envoy for Ukrainian affairs.
Apostolic Visitation
to Ukraine
In
consultation with the Roman Catholic hierarchy, Ukrainian diplomats had first
asked for an apostolic visitation on 14 September 1918. Achille Ratti encouraged
Jan Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz to petition Holy See and even declared himself
willing to perform the visitation personally. He also signaled his approval for Tyshkevych to be appointed envoy to the Holy See. Despite this, Tyshkevych voiced Ukrainian dissatisfaction with Ratti’s alleged bias toward the Poles. From
May through October 1919, Tyshkevych and Tokarzewski did not cease to petition
for the appointment of an apostolic visitor to Ukraine and Eastern Galicia, and
the exclusion of Ratti from this charge.
The
internal situation in the Ukrainian Republic was only one factor impeding an apostolic
visitation. Reports continued to arrive at the Vatican of persecution of
Ukrainians in Galicia, at the hands of the victorious Poles. In one such
report, of April 1919, Achille Ratti expressed his own fears that the Poles intended
to eliminate the Greek-Catholic Church altogether. In September, the Government
threatened to recall its ambassador if the Holy See “ruled in favor of the
Ukrainians.”
A
summary of the Galician situation was brought to Benedict XV on 28 January
1920. The Oriental Congregation concluded that an unbiased inspection was
necessary, in order to verify the reports and provide humanitarian aid. A
purely religious mission was proposed without political connotations, which
would show interest in Ukrainians affairs without provoking diplomatic rupture
with the Poles. On 13 February, Benedict XV appointed Giovanni Genocchi as
apostolic visitor to Ukraine. His shrewd judgment and diplomatic finesse were esteemed
by the diplomats of Rampolla school, including his old classmate, Pope Benedict.
Genocchi’s
instructions outlined three main aspects of his mission. The first was public:
the visitation was a benevolent gesture, especially in the form of medical aid to
devastated Ukrainian people. The second was not public: to prepare terrain for the
Catholic Church in Ukraine. And the third was secret: to verify the persecution
and help the Greek-Catholic Church in Polish-administered Eastern Galicia. Genocchi
was told that “the
Holy See has no reason to be opposed to the Ukrainians’ demands for
statehood, if they are able to practically maintain their independence and if
it is recognized by the international community, and looks benevolently on
their efforts, which it hopes will be advantageous for Catholicism.” The visitor
was told to emphasize the equality of the Latin and Byzantine Catholic Rites,
to establish the facts in Galicia and relay them to Holy See, which would bring
them to attention of Poland at an opportune time. On his way from Rome,
Genocchi met with Ukrainian representatives in Paris, Vienna, and Warsaw. He
spoke Metropolitan Sheptytsky six times in Vienna and was impressed by his
integrity and holiness.
Hitherto
the Warsaw Nunciature had been responsible for Ukrainian affairs. As the
visitor had to travel through Poland, the Secretariat of State asked Ratti to
take Genocchi’s mission under his wing. But unbeknown to the Vatican, Genocchi
was arriving at the worst possible moment. Before he could reach Lviv, the
Poles took control of his mission. Marshall Pilsudski had concluded an alliance
with UNR and was in the midst of liberating it from Bolshevik rule. En route to
Lviv, Genocchi was summoned to Warsaw where he was told that Pilsudski had
decided that he should wait until military victories made it safe for him to go
to Kyiv. Ratti promised to personally accompany him in June, Pilsudski promised
to pay the journey, and Bishop Dubowski of Lutsk promised them hospitality, along
the way.
Polish hopes came to
naught. By the end of June, the Bolsheviks had begun a counter-attack that would lead them to the
very gates of Warsaw. As the government abandoned the capital, Ratti sent Genocchi
to Vienna where, on 14 September 1920, the visitor submitted a full report to Pope
Benedict. One of Genocchi’s conclusions was that “many Ukrainians feel
abandoned by the Holy See because it does not [intervene to] stop the Polish
persecutions.” Due to his forthright evaluations, future primate of Poland,
Father August Hlond, told Genocchi that he would not be welcomed back to Poland
anytime soon. The most concrete result of the apostolic visitation was the aide
provided: 150,000 Italian Lire via the Red Cross for Ukrainian children, 131
cases of medicine worth 100,000 Lire, 50,000 Lire to the destitute
Greek-Catholic clergy in Galicia. From Vienna, he also sent 220,000 Marks for the
Latin Bishops in Ukraine, and for Greek-Catholic bishops and religious in Eastern
Galicia.
Perhaps as
significant as humanitarian diplomacy were the reports which the visitor sent
to Rome. Genocchi’s judgments, and those of others, led Benedict XV to make more
than one clamorous gestures in support of Ukrainians. On 24 February 1921, the
pontiff addressed a public letter to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, ostensibly upon
the re-opening of the Ruthenian College in Rome. The letter was actually a solemn
act of solidary with the Ukrainian people and contained allusions to religious
persecution under Polish mandate. Even Genocchi was shocked by the strength of
the protest and by the fact that his mission had been cited publically. Against
counsels of prudence from the Secretariat of State, Pope Benedict insisted that
this letter be published in the June 1921 fascicle of the Acta Apostolicae Sedis. As a result, Poland made good on its
promise and recalled its ambassador to the Holy See. Then, on 16 July 1921, the
pope lectured the Polish Episcopate in another public letter, admonishing them
to manifest universal charity for their fellow clergy of different
nationalities and rites. By the end of the year, the Polish press was reporting
that Cardinal Gasparri had advised the new Polish ambassador not to upset the
Holy Father by saying anything against “his beloved Ukrainians.”
The Bolshevik
takeover of Ukraine precluded the possibility that Father Genocchi would be
able to carry out his mission. In December 1921, he asked to be recalled on
condition that the Visitation to Ukraine continue, at least on paper, as a
gesture of solidarity. Upon his arrival in Rome, in January 1922, Benedict XV
insisted on receiving him immediately, despite the fact that the pontiff was in
his last illness and died a few days after the audience. Elected to the papacy
as Pius XI, Achille Ratti retained Genocchi as his official Ukrainian advisor
and sent him back to Eastern Galicia for one more visitation. In gratitude for Genocchi’s
efforts, the UNR government-in-exile sent a delegation to his funeral, in 1926.
Friends and Failed
Dreams
The
Entente’s politics of “might makes right” prevailed over Wilson’s principals of
national self-determination and over Benedict XV’s ethics which opposed a peace
dictated to the vanquished by the victors. Ukraine arose from the ashes of the
War, but it’s foes were too powerful and its allies to few. Nonetheless, it was
destined to remain nominally on the map as “the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic,” a concession to the national movement that even Lenin was hard-pressed
to refuse.
Benedict
XV made a place for Ukraine in his Pax
Romana, his ethical peace with the Papacy as mediator and magister. Througout the long history of
its travails, Ukraine never forgot that he was one of the few leaders who
showed it any kindness. When Giaccomo della Chiesa died, in January 1922, condolences
arrived at the Holy See declaring that: “Ukrainians have lost a friend and magnanimous
protector,” and a “special benefactor.” Indeed, the same understanding and support
for Ukraine was never again to be seen in the Vatican corridors, up to the
present day.
Non omnia praetera vulgata hac de re sunt:
multa tabulariis sunt, quae cum proferentur, nimium quantum Benedicti
sapientiam, iustitiam, constantiam, caritetem illustrabunt.
—Laudatio Benedicti XV P.M. habita in Aede Xystina (February 1922)
